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PREFACE 
This book presents the papers of the 4th Annual MAA Schlechtriem CJSG Conference, 
held on 18 March 2012 in Hong Kong. Tue conference is held on an annual basis, 
alternating between Hong Kong and Vienna, with the original conference in Vienna 
in 2009.1 
Tue annual conference is named in honour of Peter Schlechtriem, who sadly passed away 
in 2007. Prof. Schlechtriem was a leading scholar in the field of international commercial 
law, and an inspiration to many. We hope it acts as a permanent reminder of his scholar-
ship. In presenting papers at the conference, we honour his great contribution to our field. 
Tue theme of the 2012 conference was 'Globalization versus Regionalization'. lt is an 
appropriate time for this debate. Tue CISG continues to grow in significance, with Brazil 
depositing its deed of accession to the CISGwith UNCITRAL as we go to print. Tue Com-
mon European Sales Law Draft Regulation is still hotly debated. 
Tue event was once again generously hosted by City University Hong Kong, with the 
ongoing leadership of Prof. Dean Wang and Associate Prof Fan Yang. We are most 
fortunate that once again the MAA have organized this event, with sponsorship by the 
host of the conference City University Hong Kong and the support of UNCITRAL. 
Mr Arno Eisen has again led this effort, and we express our sincere gratitude to him. 
We also thank Ms Vivienne Tsao for her administrative assistance. 
Naturally, we extend our thanks to all who contributed to this volume, and the edit-
ing work performed by Matt Slater. All websites listed in the collection were last visited 
1November2012, unless otherwise indicated. 
Ingeborg Schwenzer & Lisa Spagnolo 
Basel & Melbourne 
Editors 
3 March2013 
Papers from the first conference, 'Conference in Honour of Peter Schlechtriem (1933-2007): Issues on the 
CISG Horizon' were collected and published in a special edition of the Vindobona Journal of International 
Commercial Law & Arbitration (2009) Val. 13(1). Papers from the second and third conferences were pub-
lished by Eleven International Publishing as collections edited by I. Schwenzer & L. Spagnolo, Towards 
Uniformity: 2nd Annual MAA Schlechtriem CISG Conference (2010), and State of Play: 3rd Annual MAA 
Schlechtriem CISG Conference (2011). 
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7 CESL AND CISG 
Ingeborg Schwenzer* 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
On 11 October 2011, the European Commission published the Proposal for a Regula-
tion of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common European Sales Law. 
This Common European Sales Law1 - CESL - is based on the Draft Common Frame of 
Reference (DCFR),2 which in turn drew heavily on the Principles of European Contract 
Law (PECL).3 CESL contains provisions on contract formation, contract interpretation 
including unfair contract terms and - as its core part - obligations and remedies of the 
parties to a sales contract.4 Furthermore, provisions on damages and interest, restitution 
as well as prescription can be found. Thus, the sphere of application of the CESL is more 
or less identical with the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
(CISG) with the exception of unfair contract terms. Tue CISG now has 79 member states 
and is by far the most successful5 international private law convention worldwide, along 
with its sister, the UN Convention on Limitation.6 
This chapter will first compare the approach and main solutions of the two instruments. lt 
will discuss whether the CESL has improved the solutions already found in the CISG and 
whether the gaps that still exist in the CISG have been filled in an acceptable way. lt will 
then discuss whether such regional unification alongside the global unification of sales 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Dr. iur. (Freiburg, Germany), LLM. (Berkeley, USA), Professor for Private Law, University of Basel, 
Switzerland, Tue author is deeply indebted to Mr Philippe Monnier, MLaw, attorney at law, for his assis-
tance in the preparation of this article, All web pages were last accessed on 31 March 2012. 
Tue CESL forms Annex I of the Regulation. After the publication of the Proposal, the European authorities re-
ceived reasoned opinions from the A~strian Federal Co011cil, the Belgian Senate, the Ger man Bundestag and 
the United Kingdom House of Commons, respectively, objecting to CESL on the grounds that it infringed the 
subsidiarity prindple. The threshold for an automatic review of the draft was, however, not met (see <www. 
ipex.eu/IPEXL-WEB/ dossier/ dossier.do? code"'CO D&year"'2011 &number=0284&app Lng"' EN >). 
C. von Bar et al. (Eds.), Principles, Definitions and Model Rufes of European Private Law, Draft Common 
Frame of Reference (DCFR), Sellier European Law Publishers, Munich, 2009. 
Principles ofEuropean Contract Law (PECL) (1999), available at <frontpage.cbs.dk/law/commission_on_ 
european_contract_law/PECL%20engelsk/engelsk_partI_og_II.htm>. 
For a general overview of CESL see D. Staudenmayer, 'Der Kommissionsvorschlag für eine Verordnung 
zum Gemeinsa1nen Europäischen Kaufrecht: 64 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (2011), p. 3491 et seq, 
See 1. Schwenzer & P. Bachern, 'Tue CISG - A Story ofWorldwide Success' in J. Kleinemann (Ed), CISG 
Part II Conference, lustus, Uppsala, 2009, p. 140. 
UN Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods of 14 June 1974. 
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law seems at all desirable and what the prospects of such an optional instrument on the 
European level might be in practice. 
7.2 SCOPE OF APPLICATION 
Let me fust address the scope of application of the two instruments. 
7.2.1 Opt In vs. Opt Out 
Tue first difference between the CESL and the CISG pertains to the mechanism of how 
and when the respective instrnments apply. 
Whereas the CISG automatically applies if the prerequisites of its Article 1 CISG - both 
parties having their places ofbusiness in contracting states, or the rules of private interna-
tional law leading to the application of the law of a contracting state - are met, the CESL is 
optional, i.e., applicability of the CESL requires an agreement of the parties to that effect. 
If the parties choose the CESL, the choice covers the CESL as a whole, and not only parts 
of it. 7 At the same time, the drafters of the CESL consider the choice of CESL as implying 
an agreement of the contractual parties to exclude the CISG should it otherwise apply.8 
Whether such a disposition can be ordered by the European authorities seems at least very 
doubtful, as the question of whether the parties have validly opted out from the CISG is 
entirely tobe decided autonomously under the CISG itself.9 
7.2.2 Sales of Goods Contracts Defined 
Both instruments govern sales of goods contracts. However, their respective scopes differ 
substantially. 
Tue CISG does not define the term 'goods' itself. Tuus, the scope of this notion must be in-
terpreted autonomously. From the very beginning, it has been highly debated whether the 
sale of software is governed by the CISG or not.10 Tue now prevailing view holds that the 
CISG applies if software is permanently transferred to the buyer, irrespective of the mode 
7 See Proposal, Para. 24. 
8 See Proposal, Para. 25. 
9 See I. Schwenzer & P. Hachem, in 1. Schwenzer (Ed.), Schlechtriem & Schwenzer, Commentary an the UN 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), 3rd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, 
Art. 6, Para. 4; see also M. Hesselink, 'How to Opt into the Common European Sales Law? Brief Comments 
on the Commission's Proposal for a Regulatiori, 20 European Review of Private Law (2012), p. 201. 
10 I. Schwenzer & P. Bachern, in Schwenzer, supra note 9, Art. 1, Para. 18. 
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in which:the software is delivered, e.g„ via disc or, as usually today, via the internet. 11 Thus, 
the CISG has been able to easily adjust to ever-changing modern electronic developments. 
Tue CESL, in contrast, still defines goods as 'any tangible movable items', 12 thus explicitly 
excluding software. This narrow and rather outdated definition of goods requires that, in 
addition to 'sale of goods', the 'supply of digital content' has tobe mentioned separately in 
all relevant provisions.13 
Another difference relates to so-called rnixed contracts. In this respect, the CISG follows 
a rather pragmatic approach. 
According to Article 3(2) CISG, the CISG applies to a mixed contractif the supply oflabour 
or other services does not form the preponderant part of the obligations. If the whole contract 
is governed by the CISG, its provisions also apply to the service part. Thus, a judge or arbitra-
tor does not have to decide whether the fact that the goods do not live up to the contractual 
requirements results from their own features or from a possible breach of a service obligation. 
Again, the approach taken by the CESL is different. 14 lt only applies to so-called related 
services, i.e„ any service related to the goods or digital content such as installation, main-
tenance, repair or processing, but explicitly excludes training services15 that ordinarily 
play an important role in more complex sales contracts on the international level.16 Fur-
thermore, even if the mixed contract is covered by the CESL, there is a distinct liability 
scheme for the breach of a service obligation. Whereas liability for breach of the delivery 
obligation under the CESL is strict, liability for breach of a service obligation depends 
on fault. 17 This means that the adjudicator faces the often unresolvable task of exactly 
11 See I. Schwenzer & P. Hachem, in Schwenzer, supra note 9, Art. 1, Para. 18; see also C. Kee, 'Rethinldng the 
Common Law Definition of Goods: in A. Büchl er & M. Müller-Chen (Eds.), Private Law, national - global -
comparative, Festschrift für Ingeborg Schwenzer zum 60. Geburtstag, Stämpfli, Bern, 2011, pp. 930 et seq. 
12 See Art. 2(h) Regulation. 
13 For the definition of digital content see Art. 20) Regulation; see further R. Feltkamp & F. Van bossele, 'Tue 
Optional Common European Sales Law: Better Buyer's Remedies for Seller's Non-performance in Sales of 
Goods?~ 19 European Review of Private Law, (2011), pp. 879 et seq. 
14 See also H.-W. Micklitz & N. Reich, 'The Commission Proposal for a 'Regulation on a Common European 
Sales Law (CESL)' - Too Broad or Not Broad Enough?~ in H.-W. .Micklitz & N. Reich (Eds.), The Com-
mission Proposal for a "Regulation on a Common European Sales Law (CESL)" - Too Broad or Not Broad 
Enough?, EUI Working Paper LAW 2012/04, European University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole, 
(2012), pp. 12 et seq. 
15 See Art. 2(m) Regulation; see also Art. 6 Regulation: exclusion of mixed-purpose contracts. 
16 See further N. Reich, 'An Optional Sales Law Instrument for European Business and C011sumers?: in 
Miclditz & Reich, supra note 14, pp. 85 et seq„ p. 89: 'The scope and content of part Von "Services related to 
a sales contract" seem to be incomplete, contradictory and will not provide legal certainty of cross-border 
B2C transactions'. 
17 Art. 148(2) CESL. 
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attributing the consequences of non-conformity to the goods themselves or the services 
part of the contract. 
7.2.3 B2B and B2C Contracts 
In regard to the personal scope, the CISG is pretty straightforward: it is concerned with 
international B2B sales contracts, thus B2C transactions are practically excluded.18 
Again, the approach taken by the CESL is different. Tue starting point is the cross-border 
European B2C sales contract, and indeed the whole instrument exudes the underlying 
policy of consumer protection, which is one of the main goals of unification of private 
law at the European level. Tue Explanatory Memorandum explicitly states that the Pro-
posal 'is consistent with the objective of attaining a high level of consumer protection'.19 
Tue second airn is to help srnall or rnediurn-sized enterprises (SME's) to benefit more 
frorn opportunities offered by the internal rnarket. 20 According to Article 7 Regulation, 
the CESL rnay be used in B2B contracts only if at least one of the parties is a SME.21 lt 
remains an open question whythe CESL, as an opting-in instrument, cannot be chosen by 
two cornrnercial entities if neither qualifies as a SME-" Furtherrnore, the CESL seems to 
assume that, in B2B sales contracts, the SME - like the consumer - is always on the side of 
the buyer, which certainly is not the case in reality. 
7.2.4 Subjects Covered 
As we all know, the CISG is only concerned with the forrnation of the contract, the rights 
and duties of the parties and the remedies in case ofbreach of contract. Issues oflimitation 
of actions are covered by the CISG's sister, the UN Convention on the Limitation Period in 
the International Sale of Goods, which, however, has not gained wide approval. There are 
significant areas not covered by the CISG, especially validity issues.23 
18 Art. 2(a) CISG; see I. Schwenzer & P. Hachem, in Schwenzer, supra note 9, Art. 2, Paras 4 et seq. 
19 Explanatory Memorandum, p. 6. 
20 See Explanatory Memorandum, p. 7. 
21 According to Art. 7(2) Regulation, a SME is a trader with less than 250 employees and an annual turnover 
not exceeding €50 million. 
22 However, the member states may open the CESL for other parties than SME; see also P. Mankowski, 'Der 
Vorschlag für ein Gemein$ames Europäisches Kaufrecht (CESL); 12 Internationales Handelsrecht, (2012), 
p. 3; H. Eidenmüller et al„ 'Der Vorschlag für eine Verordnung über ein Gemeinsames Europäisches 
Kaufrecht', 67 Juristen Zeitung(2012), pp. 273 et seq.; Scottish Law Commission, '.An Optional CommonEu-
ropean Sales Law: Advantages and Problems; November 2011, at 88, available at <lawcommission.jllstice. 
gov.uk/docs/Common_European_Sales_Law_Advice.pdf>, p. 88. 
23 Art. 4, sentence 2(a) CISG; see in detail I. Schwenzer & P. Hachem, in Schwenzer supra note 9, Art. 4, Paras 
29 et seq. 
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Tue CESL, in addition to the areas covered by the CISG and the Limitation Convention, 
fills some of the open or at least perceived gaps left by the CISG. Apart from the right 
to withdraw in B2C contracts)24 it deals with mistake, fraud, threat and exploitation,25 
addresses unfair contract terms,26 and proli:fically regulates pre-contractual information 
duties.27 Still, significant areas of general contract law are not covered by the CESL and 
thus are left to the otherwise applicable domestic law.28 
7.3 THE TENSION BETWEEN CERTAINTY AND FAIRNESS 
One of the major problems each commercial contract law system has to face is the tension 
between certainty and predictability on the one side and fairness on the other side. Shall 
the parties be bound to what they agreed or shall the adjudicator be granted the power 
to interfere with their agreement on grounds of fairness and conscionability? Already in 
1598, Shakespeare pul this question in the centre of his play 'Tue Merchant of Venice'. 
ls Antonio bound to his promise of 'a pound of flesn in case of not being able to repay 
the loan, or is this an unfair contract term tobe disregarded under the circumstances?29 
lt is one of the most salient features ofEnglish commercial law that it strongly favours cer-
tainty over fairness whereas many civil law legal systems tend to rely on notions of good 
faith and fair dealing. lt was against this background that in the CISG 'the observance of 
good faith in international Irade' was only inserted in Article 7(1) CISG as one criterion 
among others tobe taken into consideration in interpreting the Convention. However, the 
drafters of the CISG explicitly decided against any provision imposing a duty of good faith 
on the parties themselves. Thus, in particular, the German notion of Treu und Glauben 
cannot be applied under the CISG although German courts and authors seem to some-
times disregard this fact. 30 By contrast, the CESL explicitly states that each party has a 
duty to act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing.31 Any breach of this duty may 
not only preclude the breaching party from exercising or relying on a right, remedy or 
defence which it would otherwise have but may in and of itself give rise to liability for any 
24 Arts. 40-47 CESL. 
25 Arts. 48-57 CESL; see on these issues A.E. Martens, 'Die Regelung der Willensmängel im Vorschlag für eine 
Verordnung über ein Gemeinsames Europäisches Kaufrechf, 211 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis, (2011), 
pp. 845 et seq. 
26 Arts. 82-86 CESL. 
27 Arts. 13-22 CESL; see A. De Boeclc, 'B2B Information Duties in the Feasibility Study: Analysis of Article 23: 
19 European Review of Private Law, {2011), pp. 790 et seq. 
28 For further criticism, see Eidenmüller et al., supra note 22, pp. 271 et seq. 
29 See Scottish Law Co1nmission, supra note 22, p. 106. 
30 See I. Schwenzer & P. Hachem, in Schwenzer, supra note 9, Art. 7, Para. 17. 
31 Art. 2(1) CESL. 
101 
INGEBORG ScHWENZBR 
loss thereby caused to the other party32 'This far reaching principle is hardly reconcilable 
with the necessity of certainty and predictability in commercial transactions and thus will 
certainly not be acceptable at least to most common law lawyers.33 
7.4 RECOMMENDED RULES 
Let us now turn to some core areas of any sales legislation where the CESL chose to deviate 
from the CISG. 
7.4.1 Non-Conformity of the Goods 
Tue litmus lest for any sales law is the rules on non-conformity of the goods.34 
Tue CISG offers clear and convincing solutions in this regard which have in many in-
stances proven to yield satisfactory results. Consequently, these provisions have served as 
a role model for domestic legislatures35 as weil as the European legislator-" Tue CISG rules 
emphasize the importance of the contract being the first and foremost reference point for 
the conformity of the goods.37 Only if the parties have not made contractual provisions 
for any specific features of the goods does the CISG establish subsidiary presumptions to 
decide whether the goods conform to the contract.38 
Without any obvious necessity, the CESL has deviated from the convincing concept of 
the CISG.39 In particular, it should be noted that deviations were not dictated by con-
swner protection. Firstly, the CESL does not recognize the important distinction between 
32 Art. 2(2) CESL. 
33 See Scottish Law Commission, supra note 22, pp. 106 et seq„ p. 113; see further N. Hofmann, 'Interpreta-
tion Rules and Good Faith as Obstades to the UK's Ratification of the CISG and to the Harmonization of 
Contract Law in Europe; 22 Pace International Law Review (2010), p. 159 et seq. 
34 For a comparative overview of the different approaches to non-conformity, see 1. Schwenzer, P. Ha ehern & 
C. Kee, Global Sales and Contract LaW, Oxford UniversityPress, Oxford, 2012, Paras 31.26 et seq. 
35 The approach taken by the CISG has been followed by modern and recently modernized legal systems in 
Central Europe, the Nordic systems as well as Eastern Europe and Central Asia; see Schwenzer & Hachem 
& Kee, supra note 34, Para. 31.45, with further references. 
36 In particular, Art. 2 of the Directive 99/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 
1999 on Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated Guarantees was based on Art. 35 
CISG, which has thus found its way into all domestic legal systems that have implemented the Directive. 
37 See Art. 35(1) CISG. 
38 See Art. 35(2) CISG. 
39 See also Eidenmüller et al., supra note 22, p. 280, according to whom the drafters of CESL should have 
adopted the provisions of Art 35 CISG rather than experimenting with the notion of conformity. 
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contractual designation of conformity and the statutory default rule.40 Instead) it requires 
the goods to Comply with contractual requirements as well as the default criteria for non-
conformity,41 thus relying on a mixed subjective/objective approach.42 'Ihis may well lead 
to absurd results as goods may be perfectly conforming to contractual requirements but 
not pass the objective test. Foodstuff that is no longer fit for human consumption maywell 
be sold as animal food. Goods without a CE labe! that may not be sold in the EU may per-
fectly be fit for export to other regions in the world.43 Furthermore, in addition to the long 
!ist of subjective and objective criteria, Article lOO(g) CESL contains a catch-all provision 
requiring the goods to 'possess such qualities and performance capabilities as the buyer 
may expecf How these expectations are tobe assessed remains largely obscure.44 
Both the CISG and the CESL require the goods to be free from any right or claim of a 
third party including those that are based on industrial or other intellectual property.45 
However, whereas under the CISG it is nowadays unanimously held46 that any claim by a 
third party triggers the seller's liability, the CESL limits the seller's liability to cases where 
the claims are not obviously unfounded. 47 
In a B2B contract both under the CISG and under the CESL, the buyer can rely on any 
lack of conformity only if it gives notice to the seller after a proper exarnination of the 
goods. 48 At the Vienna Conference these provisions were highly debated, leading to the 
well-known compromise that if the buyer has an excuse for not having examined 
the goods or giving proper notice, it may still reduce the price or claim damages except for 
loss of profit.49 Under the CESL, instead of offering a better protection to SME buyers - as 
envisaged - the prerequisites for examiniltion and notice are even high er. 50 Examination 
must be undertaken within a rigid fourteen days from the date of delivery of the goods,51 
and there is no exception in case of reasonable excuse. A further change for the worse as 
regards the position of the buyer is the fact that the notice in any case must reach the seller 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
This is also evidenced by the very order in Art 66 CESL that suggests that the noll-mandatory rules of CESL 
prevail over implied terms of the contract. 
See Arts. 99, 100 CESL; see also Feltkamp &Vanbossele, supra note 13, pp. 886 et seq. 
See also Feltkamp & Vanbossele, supra note 13, pp. 886 et seq. 
See for the interplay of the CE mark and conformity of the goods: I. Schwenzer, in Schwenzer, supra 
note 9, Art. 35, Para. 14. 
For similar critidsm, see Feltkamp & Vanbossele, supra note 13, p. 887. 
See Art. 42 CISG; Art. 102 CESL 
See I. Schwenzer, in Schwenzer, supra note 9, Art. 41, Para. 10; Art. 42, Para. 6. 
Art. 102(1) CESL; see also Feltlcamp & Vanbossele, supra note 13, p. 888. 
Arts. 38, 39, 43 CISG; Arts. 121, 122 CESL. 
Art. 44CISG. 
Arts. 121, 122 CESL; see also Feltkamp & Vanbossele, supra note 13, pp. 895 et seq. 
Art. 121(1) CESL. 
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to becorne effective,52 whereas under the CISG53 the seller bears the risk that the notice is 
lost or delayed in transit. 
7.4.2 Remedies 
Tue second core area of any sales law codi:fication is the issue of remedies in case of 
breach of contract.54 Tue ClSG and CESL agree on the basic structure of remedies, as 
they apply the remedy-oriented approach rather than the old Roman cause-oriented 
approach. 55 Upon closer analysis of the remedies, however, remarkable differences 
appear. 
7 .4.2.1 Specific Performance 
Tue first remedy to discuss is specific performance.56 lt is well known that the ClSG has 
not bridged the gap between comrnon law57 and civil law58 legal systerns concerning 
the general rernedy of speci:fic perforrnance. Instead, it leaves it to the court or arbitral 
tribunal to decide whether it enters a judgment for specific performance.59 lt has to be 
ernphasized that this cornpromise has not given rise to difficulties in practice.60 In accord 
with continental legal thinking, the CESL, from a systematic perspective, instead seems 
to envisage speci:fic performance as the prirnary rernedy. 61 Thus, the principal provision 
52 Art. 10(3) CESL. 
53 Art. 27 CISG. 
54 See C. Wilhelm, 'Die Rechtsbehelfe des Käufers bei Nichterfüllung nach dem Vorschlag der Europäischen 
Kommission für eine Verordnung überein Gemeinsames Europäisches Kaufrecht (KOM [2011] 635 endg.): 
11 Internationales Handelsrecht, (2011), p. 226; Eidenmüller et al„ supra note 22, pp. 280 et seq.; Feltkamp & 
Vanbossele, supra note 13, pp. 897 et seq.; Scottish Law Commission, supra note 22, pp. 59 et seq.; see farther, 
for a comparative overview, Schwenzer, Bachern & Kee, supra note 34, Paras 41.01 et seq. 
55 Seel Samoy, T. DangVu & S. Jansen, 'Don't Find Fault, Find a Remedy; 19 European Review of Private Law, 
(2011), pp. 862 et seq.; Schwenzer & Hachem & Kee, supra note 34, Paras 41.45 et seq.; for a comparison of 
CISG and CESL regarding the seller's right to eure: see S. Kruisinga, '1he Seller's Right to Cure in the CISG 
and the Common European Sales Law: 19 European Review of Private Law, (2011), pp. 911 et seq. 
56 See generally Schwenzer, Hachem & Kee, supra note 34, Paras 43.01 et seq. 
57 See Schwenzer, Hachem & Kee, supra note 34, Paras 43.24 et seq. 
58 See Schwenzer, Hachem & Kee, supra note 34, Paras 43.11 et seq. 
59 See Art. 28 CISG: 'If, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, one party is entitled to require 
performance of any obligation by the other party, a court is not bound to enter a judgement for specific per-
formance unless the court would do so und er its own law in respect of similar contracts of sale not governed 
by this Convention: 
60 M. Müller-Chen, in Schwenzer, supra note 10, Art. 28, Para. 4, 
61 Wilhelm, supra note 54, p. 226; see also Scottish Law Commission, supra note 22, pp. 65 et seq.; Samoy 
& Dang Vu & Jansen, supra note 55, p. 869; see further, on the DCFR, G. De Vries, 'Right to Specific 
Performance: ls 1here a Divergence between Civil- and Common-Law Systems and, If So, How Has lt 
Been Bridged in the DCFR?: 17 European Review of Private Law, (2009), pp. 596 et seq.; M. Stümer, 'Die 
Grenzen der Primärleistungspflicht im Europäischen Vertragsrecht; 19 European Review of Private Law, 
(201_1), pp. 180 et seq. 
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for the buyer's right to specific performance does not contain any truly relevant restric-
tions.62 .A:. feasortable restriction of the remedy of specific performance in cases where 
the creditor should resort to a substitute transaction is not provided in the context of 
the buyer's right to specific performance, but only for the respective right of the seller in 
case ofbreach of contract by the buyer. 63 lt appears doubtful whether such an approach is 
acceptable to any common law lawyer. 
A special form of specific performance in case of non-conformity of the goods is repair 
and replacement.64 The CISG restricts the seller's obligation to repl<ice non-conforming 
goods to cases where non-conformity amounts to a fundamental breach of contract in 
order to avoid costly and unreasonable transportation of the goods.65 This restriction is 
not found in the CESL, not even for a B2B contract. lt may be questionable whether this 
makes commercial sense between a Lithuanian seller and a Portuguese buyer. lt certainly 
cannot serve as a model on the global scale. 
7.4.2.2 Avoidance of Contract 
In B2B contracts, both the CISG as well as the CESL in principle allow avoidance of 
contract in case of a fundamental breach of contract supplemented by the so-called 
Nachfrist-principle.66 In B2C contracts, however, under the CESL the consumer 
may avoid the contract for any non-conformity unless the lack of conformity is 
insignificant. 67 
Both sets of rules use an essentially identical definition for the fundamentality of the 
breach. 68 However, the CESL goes one step further by holding that fundamentality is 
also given where the breach of contract is of such a nature as to make it clear that the 
non-performing party's future performance cannot be relied on.69 Whether such a future 
breach itself amounts to a fundamental one is immaterial. 
62 See Art. 110(3) CESL: exclusion of specific performance only where it is impossible or unlawful or where 
the burden to the seller is disproportionate to the benefit for the buyer; see Jurther Feltkamp & Vanbossele, 
supra note 13, p. 897. For the general exceptions from specific performance in Civil Law legal systems see 
Schwenzer, Hachem & Kee, supra note 34, Paras 43.20 et seq. 
63 An. 132(2) CESL. 
64 See Feltkamp & Vanbossele, supra note 13, p. 898; Samoy, Dang Vu & Jansen, supra note 55, p. 869. 
65 See Art. 46(2) CISG; see further Schwenzer & Hachem & Kee, supra note 34, Paras 49.15 et seq. 
66 Buyer: Art. 49 CISG, Arts. 114(1), 115 CESL; seller: Art. 64 CISG, Arts 134, 135 CESL; see furtherWilhelm, 
supra note 54, p.230; Feltlcamp & Vanbossele, supra note 13, pp. 899 et seq.; Schwenzer, Hachem & Kee, 
supra note 34, Paras 47.112 et seq. 
67 Art 114(2) CESL; see Eidenmüller etal., supranote 22, p. 282; Feltkamp & Vanbossele, supra note 13, p. 901; 
Wilhelm, supra note 54, p. 231; see further Scottish Law Commission, supra note 22, pp. 60 et seq., criticizing 
that the consumer's right to avoid the contract is too lang and too uncertain. 
68 See Art. 25 CISG; Art. 87(2)(a) CESL. 
69 Art. 87(2)(b) CESL. 
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7.4.2.3 Damages 
Tue rules on damages in the CESL70 by and !arge follow those of the CISG.71 However, 
the CESL now contains an explicit provision that non-economic loss may only be com-
pensated for as far as it results frorn pain and suffering. Other non-econornic lasses are 
excluded.72 Tue CISG) in contrast, does not contain a similar restriction, leaving it to 
further legal development whether and which non-economic loss may be compensated.73 
7.4.3 Force Majeure and Hardship 
Both the CISG as weil as the CESL provide that the debtor is exempted from liability for 
damages in case of an impediment beyond its control.74 Tue CESL force majeure provision 
can be regarded as being more or less equivaient to that of the CISG. However, the CESL 
does not discuss force majeure in the chapter on damages but rather in a chapter dealing 
with 'General provisions~75 
Furtherrnore, it has tobe emphasized here once more that, as regards service obligations, 
the CESL follows the fault-based approach ofRoman law descent. Thus, in these cases, the 
seil er is exempted from liability if there was no fault on its part. 
Unlike the CISG, the CESL contains a specific provision on variation or termination by 
court in case of a change of circumstances commonly referred to as hardship.76 For vari-
ous reasons, this provision is not convincing. First) it seems preferable to deal with both 
force majeure and hardship under the same provision as it is done under the CISG.77 
All too often, drawing the line between force majeure and hardship is not possible. 
70 Arts. 159-165 CESL, supplemented by Art. 2(c) Regulation; see further Eidenmüller et al., 2012 (supra note 
22), pp. 282 et seq.; Feltl{amp & Vanbossele, supra note 13, p. 903; Wilhelm, supra note 54, pp. 232 et seq. 
71 Arts. 74-77 CISG; see generally Schwenzer & Hachem & Kee, supra note 34, Paras 44.01 et seq. 
72 Art. 2(c) Regulation; seefurther Scottish Law Commission, supra note 22, pp. 64 et seq., criticizing the 
restriction as a reduction in conswner protection. 
73 See 1. Schwenzer, in Schwenzer, 2010, supra note 9, Art. 74, Paras 18 et seq., Para. 39; 1. Schwenzer & 
P. Bachern, 'Tue Scope of the CISG Provisions on Damages: in R. Cunnington & D. Saidov (Eds.), Contract 
Damages: Domestic and International Perspectives, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2008, p. 100. 
74 Art. 79 CISG; Art. 88(1) CESL; see Wilhelm, supra note 54, pp. 232 et seq.; see fttrther Schwenzer, Hachem 
& Kee, supra note 34, Paras 45.01 et seq. 
75 Chapter 9, Arts. 87-90 CESL. 
76 Art. 89 CESL; see further Schwenzer, Hachem & Kee, supra note 34, Paras 45.10 et seq., 45.76 et seq. 
77 Tue modernized German law of obligations also contains independent rules on impossibility (§ 275 CC) 
and hardship (§ 313 CC). In particular, the relationship between the provision on impossibility due to per-
formance having become overly onerous for the debtor (§ 275(2) CC) and the provision on adaptation of 
the contract to changed circumstances renderingperformance overly onerous for the debtor (§ 313(1) CC) 
has now caused considerable debate as regards their delimitation, see P. Schlechtriem & M. Schmidt-Kessel, 
Schuldrecht - Allgemeiner Teil, 6th edn, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2005, Para. 485. 
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Most subsequent events do not render performance impossible and thus do not constitute 
a veritable impediment; they just render performance more onerous for the debtor. Tue 
prerequisites as weil as the consequences for both cases should be the same. Especially, 
contrary to what the CESL suggests,78 there should be no difference between an initial 
hardship and hardship caused by a change of circumstances subsequent to the conclu· 
sion of the contract. Under the CESL, in case of initial hardship, the debtor would have to 
rescind the contract for mistake. Finally, the consequences of hardship laid down in the 
CESL are unsatisfactory- at least with regard to sales contracts. Tue parties' duty to rene-
gotiate79 as well as a possible adjustment of the contract80 to the changed circumstances by 
a court or arbitral tribunal is of practical use only in long· term relationships but usually 
not in sales contracts. All in all, here again, the results achievable under the CISG are more 
satisfactory than those under the CESL. 81 
7.4.4 Interplay of Different Remedies 
Tue relationship between different remedies is of great importance. 82 As has been pointed 
out, remedies laid down under the CESL just as under the CISG in the special part relating 
to seller's and buyer's obligations are subject to certain restrictions, such as the examina-
tion and notice requirement, 83 the fundamentality of the breach in the case of avoidance84 
or the foreseeability test in case of damages.85 Under the CESL, however, other remedies 
exist that may conflict with these remedies and their underlying concepts.86 Most notably, 
non ·conformity of the goods may give rise to other remedies. Certainly, any buyer of non· 
conforming goods is mistaken as to the goods conforming to the contract.87 Thus, if the 
prerequisites of Article 48 CESL are met, the buyer may avoid the contractnotwithstanding 
78 See Art. 89(3)(a) CESL: 'apply only if: (a) the change of circumstances occurred after the time when the 
contract was concluded~ 
79 Art. 89{1) CESL; see further Schwenzer & Hachem & Kee, supra note 34, Paras 45.111 et seq. 
80 Schwenzer & Bachern & Kee, supra note 34, Paras 45.113 et seq. 
81 See for the solution offered under the CISG: 1. Schwenzer, in Schwenzer, supra note 9, Art. 79, Para. 54; 
1. Schwenzer, 'Force Majeure and Hardship in International Sales Contracts: 39 Victoria University ofWel-
lington Law Review, (2009), pp. 721 et seq., p. 724; 1. Schwenzer, 'Die clausula und das CISG: in W. Wiegand 
et al. (Eds.), Tradition mit Weitsicht- Festschrift für Bugen Bucher zuni 80. Geburtstag, 2009, pp. 736 et seq.; 
I. Schwenzer & P. Hachem, 'Tue CISG - Successes and Pitfalls: 57 American Journal of Comparative Law, 
(2009), pp. 474, 475. 
82 See on the lacking hierarchy of remedies under CESL: Samoy, Dang Vu & Jansen, supra note 55, p. 869 
etseq.; Feltkamp & Vanbossele, supra note 13, p. 891 et seq.; seegenerallySchwenzer & Hachem & Kee, supra 
note 34, Paras 49.01 et seq. 
83 Arts. 38, 39 CISG; Arts. 121 et seq. CESL. 
84 Mt,. 25, 49(l)(a) CISG; Mt,. 87(2), 114(1) CESL. 
85 Art. 74 CISG; Art. 161 CESL. 
86 For general criticism on the Jack of structure and coherence in the CES:Cs system of remedies see Samoy, 
Dang Vu & Jansen, supra note 55, p. 861 et seq. 
87 See for a comparative overview: Schwenzer & Hachem & Kee, supra note 34, Paras 49.15 et seq. 
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whether for example it gave timely notice of the non-conformity or whether the breach 
amounted to a fundamental one.88 Article 57 CESL explicitly provides that a party may 
pursue either one of the possible remedies.89 Further problems arise if the seller has failed 
to comply with any of its pre-contractual information duties which presumably will be 
usually al!eged by buyers in case of non-conformity of the goods. This not only triggers the 
remedy of avoidance due to mistake90 but furthermore entails liability for any loss caused 
to the other party by such failure which again may be claimed independently from and ad-
ditionally to any other remedies for breach of contract.91 Again, this stands in sharp con-
trast to the solution found under the CISG. As the CISG itself governs neither mistake nor 
pre-contractual duties, it is a question of the possible relationship between CISG remedies 
and concurrent domestic remedies. In case law92 and doctrine,93 it is now unanimously 
held that the CISG pre-empts all concurrent domestic remedies in this field. 
7.5 PILLING THE GAPS 
In order to evaluate the appropriateness of the CESL, it is useful to also have a look at those 
areas of sales law that do not have a counterpart in the CISG. We shall now discuss how 
the CESL has filled these gaps. Naturally, only a few select subjects can be discussed here. 
7.5.1 Pre-Contractual Duties and Liability 
Tue CISG, in principle, does not contain any rules on pre-contractual duties; a proposition 
to insert a provision on culpa in contrahendo was even rejected at the Vienna Conference.94 
In contrast, the CESL has devoted a whole chapter to pre-contractual information duties.95 
First of all, a variety of information duties are established which apply to B2C transactions 
88 The CESL thus follows the position found in the PECL and the DCFR; see Schwenzer, Bachern & Kee, supra 
note 34, Para, 49.24, 
89 For an overview of the different approaches that can be taken in thls respect, see Schwenzer, Bachern & Kee, 
supra note 34, Paras 49.11 et seq. 
90 Mt. 48(l)(b)(ii) CESL. 
91 Mt. 29(1), 29(3) CESL. 
92 Cf for France: Cass. Civ. l'e, 14 May 1996, 71 Jurisclasseur Periodique, Edition Generale (1997), No, I-4009; 
for Austria: OGH, 13 April 2000, CISG-online 576, with a note by P. Schlechtriem, 21 IPRax, pp. 161 
et seq. (2001), pp. 161 et seq.; see furtherthe more recent US case: Electrocraft Arkansas, Inc. v. Super Electric 
Motors, Ltd., US District. Court. (E.D. Arlc), 23 December 2009, CISG-online 2045. 
93 1. Schwenzer, in Schwenzer, supra note 9, Art. 35, Paras 46 et seq„ Para. 48 with references. 
94 See U.G. Schroeter, in Schwenzer, supra note 9, Introduction Arts. 14-24, Paras 54 et seq. 
95 Chapter 2, Arts. 13-29 CESL; see further C. Cravetto & B. Pasa, 'The "Non-sense" of Pre-contractual In-
formation Duties in Case ofNon-concluded Contracts: 19 European Review of Private Law, (2011) p. 761 
et seq.; Eidenmüller et al., supra note 22, pp. 276 et seq.; in regard to the Feasibility Study, see B. Beale & 
G. Howells, 'Pre-contractual Information Duties in the Optional Instrument; in R. Schulze & J. Stuyck, 
Tbwards a European Contract Law, Sellier European Law Publishers, Munich, 2011, pp. 51 et seq. 
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only.96 B~t also in a B2B contract, the seller has to give any information concerning the 
main characteristics which the goods have or can be expected to have and which would be 
contraryto good faith and fair dealing not to disclose to the other party.97 In B2B contracts, 
such vague and extensive information duties seem to be inappropriate and must neces-
sarily lead to legal uncertainty that cannot be tolerated in international trade.98 Further 
pre-contractual information duties are established for contracts concluded by electronic 
means, especially via websites.99 
lt has already been pointed out that the possibility to concurrently rely on remedies for 
breach of pre-contractual information duties is particularly problematic. 
7.5.2 Non-Negotiated Terms 
Tue use of non-negotiated terms is, especially in international sales contracts, of great 
practical hnportance. 
Tue CISG does not even mention this notion. Now, however, due to more than twenty 
years of practical experience, it has been possible to carve out the essential solutions 
pertaining to non-negotiated terms. 100 
By contrast, the CESL even distinguishes between non-negotiated terms and standard 
contract terms.101 For the latter it practically copies the German Civil Code102 and defines 
standard terms as non-negotiated terms which have been formulated in advance for sev-
eral transactions involving different parties. 103 Tue necessity for such a subtle distinction 
at best remains obscure.104 Tue dualism of two distinct concepts in this regard is unknown 
to any legal system, be it on a domestic or an the European level.105 
96 Arts, 13-22 CESL. 
97 Art. 23(1) CESL. 
98 See S. Whittaker, 'The "Draft Common Frame ofReference" -An Assessment: Report commissioned by the 
Ministry ofJustice, United Kingdom, (2008), pp. 100 et seq. 
99 Art. 24 CESL, applyingto B2C and B2B contracts; Art 25 CESL, unclear whether (3) may also be applied in 
B2B transactions. 
100 See U,G. Schroeter in Schwenzer, supra note 9, Introduction to Arts 14-24, Paras 5 et seq,; Art. 14, Paras 32 et seq, 
101 Eidenmüller et al, supra note 22, pp. 278 et seq.; H.-W. Miclditz, 'An Optional Law on Off-prenüses, Distance 
Sales and Unfair Terms for European Business and Consumers?', in Micklitz & Reich, supra note 14, pp. 58 et 
seq.; in regard to the Feasibility Study's provisions on unfairness and non-negotiated terms see D. Mazeaud, 
'Unfairness and Non-Negotiated Terms; in Schulze & Stuyck, supra note 95, pp. 123 et seq.; M.W. Hesselink, 
'Unfair Terms in Contracts Between Businesses', in Schulze & Stuyck, supra note 95, pp. 131 et seq. 
102 § 305(1), sentences 1, 3 C.C. 
103 Art 2(d) Regulation. 
104 Art. 7(3) CESL seems to imply the presumption that tenns in standard contract terms are non-negotiated terms. 
105 See Art. 3 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, which 
dispenses with the requirement that the terms have been drafted for use in more than one transaction. 
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Tue CESL contains a specific regime for non-negotiated terms and standard terms as re-
gards the incorporation of such terms into the contract as well as the judicial control of 
unfair terms. 
7.5.2.l Incorporation 
On the level of incorporation, problems arise where non-negotiated terms are tobe in-
corporated by reference. Tue CESL contents itself with the vague formula that the party 
supplying the terms must take reasonable steps to draw the other party's attention to 
them.106 lt remains an open question whether, especially in B2B contracts, a mere refer-
ence to standard terms is enough. Furthermore, as the requirement of transparency does 
not apply in the B2B context, 107 it is unclear what requirements as to language etc. exist. 
Further difficulties arise with regard to the battle of forms. Tue provision dealing with this 
issue only applies to standard terms but not to mere non-negotiated terms.108 lt is hard to 
see the underlying ratio of this approach. Regardless of this fact, this provision in essence 
does not add much to what is the prevailing opinion under the CISG.109 
7.5.2.2 Substantive Control 
Whereas under the CISG the substantive control of (all) contract terms in principle is 
a question of validity and thus left to the applicable domestic law, 110 the CESL contains 
specific provisions for this matter.111 As regards B2C contracts, in addition to a general 
clause112 circumscribing unfairness, the CESL establishes a so-called black list of contract 
terms which are always unfair with 11 items113 and a so-called grey !ist of terms which 
are presumed tobe unfair with 23 items.114 As regards B2B contracts, the CESL contains 
a general clause only.115 This provision slightly deviates from the concept of unfairness in 
B2C contracts and only applies to non-negotiated terms.116 According to this definition, 
106 Art. 70(1) CESL. 
107 Art. 82 CESL only refers to B2C contracts. 
108 See the heading and wording of Art. 39 CESL. 
109 Under the Convention, the dispute has narrowed down to two approaches: the so-called last-shot doctrine 
and the so-called knock-out doctrine. Under the first doctrine, the non-negotiated terms which have been 
sent last become part of the contract. Under the second doctrine, conflicting tenns are stricken out andre-
placed bythe default rule. This second view has become the prevailingview under the CISG, - see Cass. civ. 
lre, 16 July 1998, CISG-online 344; BGH, 9 January 2002, CISG-online 651; U.G. Schroeter, in Schwenzer, 
supra note 9, Art. 19, Para. 36 with numerous references also for domestic laws and uniform projects. 
110 See Art. 4, sentence 2(a) CISG; 1. Schwenzer & P. Bachern, in Schwenzer, supra note 9, Art. 4, Para. 30. 
111 For criticism see EidenmüUer et al., supra note 22, pp. 278 et seq. 
112 Art. 83 CESL. 
113 Art. 84 CESL. 
114 Art. 85 CESL; see farther Micklitz, supra note 101, pp. 62 et seq. 
115 Art. 86 CESL; see Eidenmüller et al., supra note 22, pp. 278 et seq. 
116 Art. 86 CESL. 
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a non-negotiated term is unfair if it grossly deviates from good commercial practice con-
trary to g~od faith and fair dealing. This gives rise to scepticism from two perspectives: 
First, this concept is extremely vague and does not give any orientation on how to draft 
fair contract terms. Second) this provision insinuates that, in a B2B transaction, an indi-
vidually negotiated term may never be regarded as being unfair - a solution that would 
significantly lag behind any domestic and international standard for a control of unfair 
terms even in B2B contracts. 117 
7.5.3 Interest 
A last lacuna under the CISG which is of great practical importance must be addressed 
here. Although the CISG provides that interest is due on any sum in arrears,118 it does 
not state the applicable interest rate.119 This has proven to be a real obstacle to achieving 
uniformity. The CESL contains six provisions on interest on late payments.120 In essence, 
it links the interest rate to the one applied by the European Central Bank which is adjusted 
every six months, or an equivalent rate set by anational central bank.121 Two percentage 
points are added to this rate for any delayed payment;122 eight percentage points are added 
where a trader delays the payment of the purchase price.123 All in all, this solution may 
meet with approvaL Still, two points deserve mentioning. First, there is an explicit provi-
sion allowing for compensation for recovery costs, be it in the form of a lump sum of €40 
or as damages if the recovery costs exceed this sum.124 Having special regard to the inter-
national discussion whether pre-trial attorney's fees should be compensated for, 125 this 
provision seems highly problematic. Furthermore, all rules on interest are mandatory
126 
which heavily impairs freedom of contract in this area.127 
117 See Eidenmüller et al., supra note 22, pp. 278 et seq., also voidng criticism. 
118 Art 78 CISG. 
119 See K. Bacher, in Schwenzer, supra note 9, Art. 78, Para. 2 with references. 
120 Arts. 166-171 CESL. See on the provisions of the DCFR: A. Fötschl, 'Zinsen auf ausservertragliche Geldfor-
derungen im Rechtsvergleich und eine Analyse der Zinsnormen des Draft Common Frame of Reference 
(DCFR): 17 European Review of Private Law, 2009, pp.106 et seq.; see further Eidenmüller et al„ supra note 
22, pp. 283 et seq. 
121 Art. 166(2) CESL. 
122 Ad. 166(2) CESL. 
123 Art. 168(1)(5) CESL. 
124 Art. 169 CESL. 
125 Zapata Hennanons Sucessores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Company, Inc., US Court of Appeals (7th Cir.), 19 
November 2002, CISG-online 684; see jurther Schwenzer & Bachern & Kee, supra note 34, Paras 44.166 
et seq.; 1. Schwenzer, in Schwenzer, supra note 9, Art. 74, Paras 28 et seq.; CISG A.C. Opinion No. 6, 'Cal-
culation ofDamages under CISG Artide 74', Rapporteur J. Gotanda, 2006, available at <www.cisgac.com/ 
default.php?ipkCab=128&ifkCat=148&sid=l48>, Comments 5.1 et seq. 
126 Art. 171 CESL. There seems tobe a contradiction betweenArt. 170 CESL that deals with unfair tenns relat-
ing to interest and Art. 171 CESL that prohibits any deviation from the statutory scheme. 
127 See also Eidenmüller et al., supra note 22, pp. 283 et seq. 
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7 .6 CODIFYING STYLE AND TECHNIQUES 
As concerns the different codifying style and techniques of the CISG and the CESL, one is 
first struck bythe sheer length ofthe CESL compared to the relatively short CISG.128 This 
is partly due to the approach taken towards definitions. Under the CISG, definitions are a 
rare exception. Their absence has not led to any problems. Contrary to the CISG, the Reg· 
ulation itself contains a long !ist of definitions.129 While it is laudable that the drafters have 
attempted to achieve a common understanding oflegal terms, it is hardly understandable 
whythe text ofthe CESL again is packed with sometimes repetitive and sometimes further 
definitions.130 
Tue sheer length of the CESL does not, however, contribute to clarity.131 Although, in com· 
parison to the DCFR, the CESL has been shortened considerably, the attempt to include 
as many scenarios as possible into the wording of the CESL has considerably inflated the 
text. This prolixity, however, has not prevented the drafters from an exorbitant132 use of 
general clauses. Tue CISG, although using much less general clauses, has been criticized 
for its vagueness. 133 Tue CESL, from this viewpoint, will hardly be acceptable, 134 especially 
to common Iaw lawyers. 135 
Finally, it is regrettable that the CESL does not use the same terminology as the CISG.136 
Tue drafters of the CISG endeavoured to depart from domesticlegal concepts, instead seek-
ing an independent legal language. Indeed, to a !arge extent, they succeeded. Tue CESL tri es 
128 Harsh critidsmfrom U. Huber, 'Modellregeln für ein Europäisches Kaufrecht: 16ZEuP, {2008), p. 742: "Tue 
provisions on sales law have to be completely reformulated ... Tue reader should not be given the impres-
sion that the drafters thinkit tobe slow-witted''. See also Eidenmüller et al., 'Der Gemeinsame Referenzrah-
men für das Europäische Privatrecht - Wertungsfragen und Kodifikationsprobleme: 63 Juristen Zeitung, 
(2008), p. 549; 'Reading the DCFR is tiring, because so much of its content is superfluous and because it 
contains numerous repetitions: 
129 Art. 2 Regulation. 
130 See, for example, Art. 7(1) CESL in addition to Art. 2(d) Regulation. See also Eidenmüller et al., supra note 
22, p. 272, with further examples of repetitive dauses. 
131 See Eidenmüller et al., supra note 128, p. 549; Feltlcamp & Vanbossele, supra note 13, p. 905; Huber, supra 
note 128, p. 742. 
132 See, in regard to the DCFR, Eidenn1üller et al., supra note 128, p. 536, who provide an impressive account of 
the excessive use of general dauses in the DCFR; see further Feltkamp & Vanbossele, 2011 (supra note 13), 
atp. 905, voidng concern that the use of open-end clauses in CESL will not lead to a sutficientlevel oflegal 
certainty. 
133 Against this critidsm: Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 81, p. 467. 
134 See Feltkamp & Vanbossele, supra note 13, p. 905, according to whom the CESL is 'not ripe for 
implementation'. 
135 See for the concerns raised in the United Kingdom: the Report issued-by the European Union Committee of 
the House of Lords, European Contract Law: The Draft Common Frame of Reference - Report with Evidence, 
London, House of Lords, Stationary Office, 2009, Paras 31 et seq. 
136 For criticism regarding the wording of the German version of CESL, see Eidenmüller et al., supra note 22, p. 272. 
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to reinvent the wheel by changing terminology !hat for almost thirty years now has become 
the lingua franca of international sales law. A prominent example, which is also crucial for 
trade practice, is the replacement of the term 'avoidance for breach of contract' used by the 
CISG with the term 'termination' in the CESL. Tue fact that the very term avoidance is used 
by the CESL in the context of mistake is hardly helpful to ease communication.137 
7.7 CONCLUSION 
Tue CESL, as it has been published recently, is hardly an improvement to the CISG !hat is now 
in force in 23 states out ofthe 27 EU member states. 138 lt has been showu that in many areas 
the differences cannot satisfy the needs of international trade.139 Many of these changes were 
highly inspired bythe German Civil Code and its underlying ! 9th century principles as well as 
a strong desire for consumer protection, both of which do not provide an adequate framework 
for B2B transactions.140 This is especially true for the abundant number of general clauses 
and vague terms.141 Tue recurrently emphasized principle of good faith certainly will not be 
regarded with favour by anyone coming from a common law country and does not add much 
to clarity and predictability - one of the principal necessities in international trade. But this is 
not at all due to a stronger protection of commercial buyers under the CESL as alleged by the 
aim of the Regulation. Instead, as has been shown, there are several instances where - with 
more clarity- the CISG offers buyers better protection than the CESL.142 
All in all, the CESL does not provide a viable alternative to the CISG.143 Practice needs a 
simple uniform law for all international and domestic sales contracts. This is why many 
137 We are aware that PICC and PECL follow the same terminology as the DCFR. However, both sets of rules 
do not contain specific provisions on sales law and their departure from the language of the CISG is already 
most unfortunate. 
138 Ireland, Malta, Portugal and the United Kingdom have not ratified the Convention. A continuously up-
dated overview of the contracting states can be found at <www.uncitral.org/uncitra1/en/uncitral_texts/ 
sale__goods/1980CISG_status.html>. 
139 For similar criticism alreadyon the DCFRsee J. Basedow, 'Kodifikationsrausch und kollidierende Konzepte -
Notizen zu Marktbezug, Freiheit und System im Draft Common Frame of Reference: 16 ZEuP, (2008), 
pp. 673 et seq.; see further K. Riesenhuber, 'Information über die Verwendung des Gemeinsamen 
Europäischen Kaufrechts: 9 Zeitschrift für Gemeinschaftsprivatrecht, (2012), p. 5, raising the question of 
whether CESL can achieve its goal ofharmonization. 
140 For similar criticism, see also Micl<litz & Reich, supra note 14, p. 31, who conclude that the CESL should be 
limited to B2C transactions, thus excluding B2B contracting from its scope of application. 
141 See, in regard to the DCFR, L. Antoniolli, F. Fiorentini & J. Gordley, 'A Case-based Assessment of the Draft 
Common Frame ofReference~ 58 Arnerican Journal of Cornparative Law, (2010), p. 351. 
142 See the references to questions of notice, obviously unfuunded claims, seller's general right to eure, non-
econonlic loss etc. 
143 See Eidenmüller et al., supra note 22, p. 285, who come to the same conclusion; see further Scottish Law 
Commission, supra note 22, p. 102. 
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modern legislators, especially in Eastern Europe, modelled their domestic sales law ac-
cording to the CISG.144 Tue CESL being only an optional instrument an the European 
level, it is - at the very least - doubtful whether any sensible trader will opt for it. 145 In 
essence, this would mean that sellers and buyers would need to adapt their contracts to 
three different situations: domestic, European and global. Furthermore, the experiences 
made with the PICC146 clearly show that parties da not make use of optional instruments 
in their choice of law clauses.147 Whereas about 80% of disputes resolved under the aus-
pices of the ICC contain a choice oflaw clause, opting-in instruments such as the PICC are 
chosen in only 0.8% of these contracts, although they may be weil appropriate to supple-
ment the CISG.148 lt seems all the more improbable that parties would opt out of the CISG 
and into the CESL which in itself would have to be supplemented by domestic law. 
lt is regrettable that the EU chose such a Sonderweg instead of maintaining its lead-
ing position in the development of.the CISG and raising its voice in the global concert. 
With the CISG becoming more and more important on the global scale, it is important 
that any harmonization or unification of laws in Europe ensures that the CISG remains 
untouched. Hopefully, however, UN CITRAL will take the lead and develop a set of 
rules of general contract law supplementing the CISG and thus filling the still existing 
gaps. Such a global contract law should be modelled an the PICC and the PECL, but 
certainly not on the CESL. 
144 See P. Schlechtriem, '25 Years of the CISG: An International lingua franca for Drafting Uniform Laws, 
Legal Principles, Domestic Legislation and Transnational Contracts' in H. Flechtner et al. (Eds.), Drafting 
Contracts Under the CISG, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, pp. 167, 174, 177; F. Zoll, 'The Impact 
of CISG on Polish Law: 71 Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, (2007), 
pp. 81 et seq. 
145 0. Lando, 'Comments and Questions Relating to the European Commission's Proposal for a Regulation on 
a Common European Sales Law: 19 European Review of Private Law, (2011), p. 720; see farther C. Herres-
thal, 'Ein europäisches Vertragsrecht als Optionales Instrument: 22 EuZW, (2011), p. 8. 
146 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts; see the newest version of the PICC pub-
lished in 2010, available at <www.unidroitorg/ english/ princi ples/ contracts/principles201O/blackletter201 0-
english. pdf>. 
147 P. Mankowski, 'CFR und Rechtswahl: in M. Schmidt-Kessel (Ed.), Der Gemeinsame Referenzrahmen_ -
Entstehung, Inhalte, Anwendung, Sellier European Law Publishers, Munich, 2009, p. 401; Lando, supra note 
145, p. 720. 
148 Mankowski, supra note 147, p. 401. 
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